Gordon L. Weil
On October 22 and 23, 2003, I visited the Kenai area in Alaska to
gather information on the impact of the ConocoPhillips/Marathon LNG
facility at Nikiski and local views on the performance of the facility and
its operators in the community.
With the assistance of the Kenai Peninsula Borough (a borough is
roughly equivalent to a strong county government), I met with a
cross-section of interested and affected parties, who provided me with a
considerable amount of information. In addition, I visited the LNG
facility. I explained the question before the Town of Harpswell. In all
cases, people responded directly to all questions I raised.
As a result of these interviews and visits, listed in Appendix A to
report, I gathered useful information for the consideration of Harpswell
people. The text of the report contains only information obtained from
Kenai sources, except where I have placed text in brackets [ ]. In
addition, I make some recommendations for further consideration.
Where I draw conclusions, I note that they are limited to the matters
addressed and should not be considered an endorsement of the proposal
before the Town, as there are other matters, beyond those addressed in
this report, that should also be taken into account. In addition,
my visit was relatively brief which limited the degree of detailed
investigation.
I express my appreciation to Bill Popp, who deals with oil and gas
matters for the Kenai Peninsula Borough and who formerly was chair of the
Borough legislative body, who arranged most interviews and Jed Watkins,
the chief engineer at the LNG facility.
THE FACILITY AND THE KENAI AREA
The LNG facility receives natural gas from drilling locations in and
around the Cook Inlet and converts it to LNG for transport to Tokyo where
it is used under long-term purchase arrangements. As an LNG delivery
point, the facility uses far more extensive processing and equipment than
is used at a receiving terminal, as is proposed for Harpswell. Thus,
noise, security and risk are somewhat higher than they would be at a
receiving terminal. The facility is not state-of-the-art in some respects,
but the operators believe that a sound maintenance program has enabled
them to have satisfactory operations over the years.
The ConocoPhillips facility was operated by Phillips before the merger
of the two companies. Marathon has a 30% minority interest in the terminal
and the ships; ConocoPhillips operates the ships and Marathon operates the
vessels. The site is smaller than the Harpswell Fuel Depot property and is
owned by the plant operators. Estimated coverage is about 50 acres with a
jetty of about 1,100 feet. It is located adjacent to a fertilizer
manufacturing facility and close to a refinery and a gas-to-liquids
operation. The nearest residences, of which there are only a few, are at
least one-half mile distant from it.
The facility includes three tanks, all of which are smaller than the
tanks that would be placed at the Harpswell Fuel Depot. LNG in storage
tanks is not held under high pressure.
The facility is located in the unincorporated town of Nikiski, situated
immediately north of the City of Kenai and within the jurisdiction of the
Kenai Peninsula Borough. The Borough includes several special taxing
districts, which allows a number of areas to levy property taxes for
designated purposes within a district. In Nikiski, for example,
supplementary taxes are levied for recreation, fire protection and senior
citizen services, all of which are distinct from taxes raised in other
areas and cities within the Borough.
The facility was constructed in 18 months, entered into service in June
1969 and has operated continuously since then. It is subject to regulation
by the State of Alaska and to arrangements resulting from 9/11
requirements. Financial requirements governing the removal of the
facility, which may occur in a few years, are set by the state government.
No bond is required in Alaska. Harpswell was advised to impose its own
removal and restoration requirements
Although not directly related to LNG, the Cook Inlet Regional Citizens
Advisory Council, established by federal law "to prevent oil spills" and
achieve "an environmentally sound Cook Inlet" was suggested as a possible
model for Casco Bay matters. The CIRCAC consists of 13 members, seven from
municipalities and boroughs and representatives of aquaculture, commercial
fishing, native, environmental, recreational and commercial interests.
SECURITY ON-SITE
Security is provided at the facility under contract with an outside
company. When a vessel is not at the jetty, one guard is on site. When the
vessel is at the jetty, two guards are on site. The security contingent
consists of four full-time and five part-time positions. Four security
personnel are on duty at all times with two additional persons assigned
when a vessel is at the jetty. The security system uses motion detection,
including fiber optics in the wire fence [identical to the fence at the
Harpswell Fuel Depot] surrounding the facility, and a roving patrol. All
personnel were formerly engaged in public law enforcement.
The site is illuminated from high poles with lighting covering wide
areas. Halogen, sodium and mercury lights are used. Given its industrial
location, the facility makes no special effort to reduce lighting impacts
on its neighbors. However, security could be satisfactorily maintained by
use of smaller, more focused fixtures.
Because of the use of its own security personnel, the facility places
no requirements on local law enforcement agencies. It has access to the
CAN system, which is similar to enhanced 911, and allows multiple persons
to be phoned simultaneously in case any community warning is required.
There have been no security incidents at the facility. Several years
ago, Greenpeace staged a demonstration at the adjacent fertilizer plant,
but there was no effect on the LNG facility.
SECURITY FOR SHIPS
Ships require approximately 19 days for the roundtrip to Japan, so that
an arrival occurs each 9-10 days with the ship remaining in port for about
25 hours. There have been more than 1,000 successful transits. Each vessel
is 239 meters or 784 feet in length and draws 11 meters or 36 feet. No
dredging has been required.
The ships are owned by ConocoPhillips/Marathon (and operated by
Marathon) and are relatively new, as has been required by the Japanese
authorities. The companies’ retired vessels have been placed in service
elsewhere.
Tanker vessels are not accompanied by either tugboats or Coast Guard
vessels. They arrive and depart in line with tide conditions. Tidal swings
of 40 feet are not unusual. Almost all arrivals and departures occur in
daylight hours. There is a 1,000 yard exclusion zone, but registered
fishing boats are allowed within this zone. Enforcement relies on reports
by the tanker masters and by other fishing vessels. The Coast Guard
indicates that a higher level of enforcement would be used if national
threat levels are increased. The Coast Guard points out such zones do not
now apply to oil tankers, which are characteristically more dangerous. It
is possible that the enforcement provisions relating to LNG vessels may be
discontinued at some future date. The Coast Guard regulation implementing
9/11 protection is contained in Appendix B to this report.
Because the same two tankers are used, the masters are known to the
other vessels, and they are familiar with the local waters. The same two
pilots, based in Homer, Alaska, are used. Pilots must be provided by
pilots’ associations in the area; there are only three in Alaska. Because
all participants are known to one another, security is enhanced.
Previously, the tanker schedules were public knowledge. Currently, the
distribution of such information is limited, but may be made available to
fishermen. Some tankers announce their presence on channels 10, 13 and 16
at specific waypoints in the approaches to Cook Inlet, allowing drift
netters, who require as much as two hours to collect their gear, ample
time to leave the channel. The LNG tankers do not necessarily adhere to
this practice, but they may be asked to do so.
When the vessel is at the jetty, the tension in the mooring lines is
electronically monitored continuously so that ice buildup can be
determined and relieved as necessary to prevent the vessel breaking loose.
The interconnection between the vessel and the terminal itself is not
capable of automatic interruption, although such technology is now
available.
IMPACT ON FISHING
Several kinds of fishing take place in the Cook Inlet. Set netters
operate close to shore, including behind the vessel mooring area at the
jetty. Drift netters operate in the Inlet, using 900 foot nets. Netters
have seasons of about two months. Halibut fishing takes place during a
10-month season and involves fishing from lines with multiple hooks along
the Inlet bottom at some distance from the terminal, but where it can be
affected by passing vessels. There is also cod fishing.
Fishermen are organized in associations that represent their interests.
They report that there has been some gear loss, most of which has been
covered by compensation within 30 days. When gear loss is caused by a
passing vessel, the fisherman may contact the tanker’s master immediately
by radio to announce the loss. Where claims cannot be readily
substantiated, they may not be paid. The fishermen would like a standard
rate for types of losses to be established. While halibut fishermen have
not been compensated for gear loss, drift netters suggest that there are
few incidents during their season, with claims amounting to about $15,000.
One vessel was capsized due to the action of one shipper (not LNG), and
the owner was fully compensated.
Fishermen engage in emergency training for which they may be
compensated at about $5,000 a year. They become first responders in case
of any oil spills. They are the best means of detecting unfamiliar vessels
in local waters and can inform the Coast Guard of the presence of such
vessels. Kenai fishermen suggested that Harpswell fishermen could also
become involved in evacuation planning if necessary (see below).
The local fishermen attempt to work cooperatively with the various
shipping facilities, because of local political circumstances. They seek
the support of the general public in their competitive battles with strong
sport fishing interests. When comparing his own experience with fishing in
Harpswell, one fisherman suggested: "They (local fishermen) are in the
community. They should be willing to make a bit of a sacrifice for the
community."
FIRE: INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION
During its existence, no fires have been reported at the Kenai LNG
facility.
In the event of a fire at the facility, it would rely on monitors
(unmanned fire fighting nozzles) on site and the Nikiski Fire Department.
Station 1 of that Department is located about a mile away. The Fire
Department would (1) extinguish fires in conventional structures such as
the office building, (2) rescue endangered personnel probably by using
foam and (3) prevent the spread of the fire by establishing water curtains
and by wetting and cooling adjacent structures. The last activity would be
carried out automatically without fire fighters having to remain near the
fire after the protection was established.
In case of a major LNG leak that came in contact with an ignition
source, a large fire would result. Any harmful thermal effects should be
contained within the property limits of the facility. To reduce the length
of the fire’s duration, fuel would be transferred out of the affected tank
into other tanks. In the case of Harpswell, the liquid would be gasified
as rapidly as possible and shipped out via the pipeline. Otherwise, the
fire would be allowed to burn itself out, which might require several
days. If such a situation arose, Harpswell Neck Road would be closed to
traffic past the facility for from six to 24 hours. A road closure would
require that any persons having to travel beyond the Fuel Depot (including
school children returning home) would need to be transported on the water
either to landings on Harpswell Neck or to Orr’s or Bailey Island. Such a
transfer could be accomplished by local boats with trained personnel. No
evacuation would be required.
The Kenai LNG facility has conducted testing with respect to vapor
cloud formation and ignition. A cloud forms from an LNG spill, but is no
higher than the width of the spill. Because the gas dissipates quickly,
fires are limited and are not sustained and essentially extinguish
themselves.
The Nikiski Fire Department has received LNG training by faculty
members of Texas A&M University who have come to the area at the expense
of Conoco/Phillips. The Department consists of 25 full-time fire fighters
and 13 volunteers (plus 10 volunteers located elsewhere on Cook Inlet). It
has become a full-time department thanks to the elevated tax revenues
Nikiski has received from the industrial facilities in its district. It
has never been called out for a fire at the LNG facility, but trains there
annually. It does not find that the LNG facility would require a full-time
department and suggests that revenues that Harpswell might receive from
the proposed facility be used for obtaining the best available equipment.
In addition, it suggests that all Harpswell companies receive LNG
training. On site, it suggests that a large water storage tank should be
required.
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
The Kenai LNG facility, a liquefaction facility, is not comparable with
a receiving terminal relative to its environmental impact. It is now under
increased state supervision as are all oil and gas facilities in Alaska in
the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster.
Environmental interests report that ConocoPhillips is "environmentally
responsible", the "best on the block" and "one of the better and more
communicative companies."
They advise that Harpswell should insure that the proposed facility
should maintain the highest standards with respect to provisions of the
Clean Water Act and prevent the use of mixing zones under the erroneous
principle that "dilution is the solution to pollution." This concern
relates to the discharge of process waters, which may not arise at the
proposed facility. In addition, rigorous enforcement of Section 112R of
the Clean Air Act is recommended; it provides for Risk Management Plans
for worst case scenarios. Finally, it was recommended that Harpswell
prevent discharges of ballast water that might contain foreign species. At
the Kenai facility, ballast water is discharged, but that would not be the
case in Harpswell. Based on good knowledge of Maine environmental law, it
was recommended that air and water operations at Harpswell be required to
meet state standards.
The largest potential sources of environmental impact will be visual
and sound. Once again, the Kenai facility is not comparable with the
proposed Harpswell facility. All power on site is purchased from the local
utility; there is a 300HP standby unit available. No attempt is made to
screen the facility from view or to reduce light impacts, because the
facility is located in an industrial area. In the night sky, the facility
(and its neighbors) affects views of the sky, but mostly only when a
person looks in the direction of the facility.
ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY EFFECTS
Under Alaska state law, all oil and gas facilities pay property taxes
at a rate of $20 per $1,000 of valuation [Harpswell is now $9.40]. Then,
the state pays the local tax rate and retains any surplus. Local taxes are
lower than this rate in the Kenai region, but the mechanism provides an
incentive for local taxing districts to increase spending, because so much
of the necessary taxes will be paid by oil and gas interests. The result
is that Nikiski provides services, for example for recreation and senior
citizens, which far exceed those in other communities. With respect to the
LNG facility, the Kenai governments or taxing districts are not required
to provide a significant level of services. Even with four industrial
operations in Nikiski, the facilities do not impose a significant burden
of the single road serving them.
There are disputes between the taxing authorities and the facilities
over their valuation, less likely to be a matter of concern where all
payments exceed property taxes as is proposed for Harpswell.
The facility employs 42 full-time and 10 contract staff. The contracted
personnel include the security staff, electrician and laborers.
The impact on the local economy was not available, but it was suggested
that it might be about $35 million or more annually. Annual payroll is
about $4 million [Harpswell is estimated to be $3.3 million]. One oil
services supplier alone bills ConocoPhillips about $6 million annually,
including for services elsewhere on Cook Inlet. Its spokesman suggests
that, if Harpswell approves the facility, local people should form their
own services company to get work that might otherwise go to out-of-state
companies. The construction phase could provide significant revenues for
the Maine economy.
Many sources commented on the positive contribution of ConocoPhillips
to funding and staffing local non-profit organizations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The information visit yielded several ideas that may merit being
pursued by the Town in its negotiations with ConocoPhillips and
TransCanada, by the companies themselves or by other interested parties.
The following points were not provided by people interviewed.
1. Continuing efforts should be made to reduce the cumbersome marine
security measures suggested for Harpswell, but not used at Kenai. The
Coast Guard detachment commander in Kenai should be put in contact with
the Portland Captain of the Port. Boston is not a good model.
2. Fishermen should be included in any emergency planning activities
and be compensated for their participation and training.
3. Water supply. The water tower should be made available for use by
the facility. It will not be adequate in itself, but it could supplement a
new water tank. Water from the usable Fuel Depot well should be made
available for routine uses; there is no reason for this well to remain
idle for 50 years. Initial and make-up water could be transported to the
site by barge or truck. A desalination plant might not be necessary.
4. Power supply. The onsite generation would be used to supply normal
requirements and for backup. In such case, some generators would be
operating at all times, constituting the largest source of noise. Power
could be supplied by cable from the Wyman units at Cousins Island with
backup generation onsite. In that case, there would be reduced generator
operation and related noise.
5. Lighting. The project should provide detailed information on area
lights and screening, which could reduce light leakage off-site.
6. Ships. Just as the Japanese have required up-to-date vessels to be
used, and the companies have used the same two vessels at Kenai, the same
principles should apply at Harpswell.
7. Environment. Maine law should apply when any provision is stricter
than federal law.
PERSONAL NOTE
I have not taken a position on the proposed LNG facility for Harpswell.
Throughout my interviews, I asked all relevant questions that I thought
would be of interest to Harpswell people and tried to obtain information
objectively. Obviously, some people were favorable to the Kenai facility,
while others had a more arm’s-length attitude. I recognize that many of
the elements of this report may appear favorable to the proposal, but not
all are. This result does not reflect any personal bias nor is this report
intended to constitute a recommendation on how either the Selectmen or the
Town Meeting should vote, especially because, in my view, we continue to
lack sufficient information to make a decision. I have included in
Appendix A a list of the people with whom I spoke and, on request, I will
put interested Harpswell people in touch with any of them who are
available.
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEWS
Dale Bagley Mayor and Borough Administrator, Kenai Peninsula Borough
Mike Chenault Representative, Alaska House of
Representatives (and Sue Wright, a member of his staff)
Gary L. Fandrei Executive Director, Cook Inlet Aquaculture Association
Steve Howell Director of Public Outreach, Cook Inlet
Regional Citizens Advisory Council
Warren P. Isham Assistant Chief, Nikiski Fire
Department
Brent Johnson Setnetter
Jeff Koehler Supervisor, Security, Kenai LNG (contract personnel)
Roland R. Maw Executive Director, United Cook Inlet
Drift Association; fisherman
Fred A. Miller President, Nikiski Chamber of Commerce;
engineer (I held question and answer session with Chamber
members at their meeting.)
Michael Munger Executive Director, Cook Inlet Regional
Citizens Advisory Council; formerly with Alaska Department
of Environmental Conservation
Lt. Mark McManus Supervisor, USCG, Marine Safety
Detachment Kenai
Mike Peek Homeowner, Nikiski
Tom Pellegrom Cook Inlet Area Manager, Peak Oilfield Service Co.
Bill Popp Oil and Gas Liaison, Kenai Peninsula Borough;
former chair of Borough Assembly
Bob Shavelson Executive Director, Cook Inlet Keeper;
interned at Natural Resources Council of Maine
R.J. "Jed" Watkins Staff Facility Engineer, Cook Inlet Area, LNG
Operations
John J. Williams Mayor, City of Kenai; former professor of petroleum
technology
4910-15-U
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 165
[COTP Western Alaska 02-001]
RIN 2115-AA97
Security zone; Liquefied Natural Gas Tankers, Cook Inlet, AK
AGENCY: Coast Guard, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The Coast Guard adopts, as final, the interim rule published
in July 2002 that established security zones for Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG) tankers in Cook Inlet, AK, within the Western Alaska Marine
Inspection Zone and Captain of the Port Zone. This final rule includes an
effective information collection requirement calling for vessel and crew
information from the owners or operators of commercial fishing vessels
desiring to fish within the security zone.
DATES: On September 4, 2002, OMB approved the collection of information
required by 33 CFR 165.1709(b)(1)(ii) as published on July 1, 2002.. This
final rule is effective [Insert date 30 days after date of publication in
the FEDERAL REGISTER.].
ADDRESSES: Comments and material received from the public, as well as
documents indicated in this preamble as being available in the docket, are
part of docket (COTP Western Alaska 02-001) and are available for
inspection or copying at Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Anchorage, AK
between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lieutenant Mark McManus, USCG Marine
Safety Detachment Kenai, at (907) 283-3292 or Lieutenant Commander Chris
Woodley, USCG Marine Safety Office Anchorage, at (907) 271-6700.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Regulatory Information
On July 1, 2002 we published an interim rule with requests for comments
entitled "Security Zone, Liquefied Natural Gas Tankers, Cook Inlet, AK" in
the Federal Register (67 FR 44057). We received no comments. No
public hearing was requested, and none was held.
Background and Purpose
In its July 2002 interim rule, the Coast Guard established 1000-yard
security zones around LNG tankers to safeguard the tankers, Nikiski marine
terminals, the community of Nikiski, and the maritime community from
sabotage or subversive acts and incidents of a similar nature. Paragraph
33 CFR 165.1709(b)(1)(ii) of that interim rule was not made effective
because the Office of Management and Budget had not yet approved the
collection of information called for by that paragraph. On September 4,
2002, OMB approved the collection of information. We are therefore
adopting the interim rule as final and we are making paragraph 33 CFR
165.1709(b)(1)(ii) effective.
You can find more detailed background information in the preamble of
the interim rule (67 FR 44057) under SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.
Regulatory Evaluation
This rule is not a "significant regulatory action" under section 3(f)
of Executive Order 12886, Regulatory Planning and Review, and does not
require an assessment of potential costs and benefits under section
6(a)(3) of that Order. The Office of Management and Budget has not
reviewed it under that Order. It is not "significant" under the regulatory
policies and procedures of the Department of Transportation (DOT) (44 FR
11040, February 26, 1979). We expect the economic impact of this rule to
be so minimal that a full Regulatory Evaluation under paragraph 10(e) of
the regulatory policies and procedures of DOT is unnecessary. This finding
is based on the minimal time that vessels will be restricted from the
zone, that vessels may still transit through the waters of Cook Inlet and
dock at other Nikiski marine terminals.
Small Entities
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612), we have
considered whether this rule would have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. The term "small entities" comprises
small businesses, not-for-profit organizations that are independently
owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental
jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000.
The Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this rule will not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
This rule will affect the following entities, some of which may be
small entities: the owners or operators of vessels intending to transit or
anchor in the vicinity of the Phillips Petroleum LNG Pier during the time
this zone is activated; and the owners or operators of fishing vessels
operating their nets in the vicinity of the Phillips Petroleum LNG Pier
during the months of July through August.
These security zones will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities for the following reasons. Marine
traffic will still be able to transit through Cook Inlet during the zones’
activation. Additionally, vessels with cargo to load or unload from other
Nikiski marine terminals in the vicinity of the zone will not be precluded
from mooring at or getting underway from the terminals. The owners of
fishing vessels that typically fish in the vicinity of the LNG pier during
the summer months will not be prohibited from operating if they notify and
provide information to the Coast Guard Marine Safety Detachment in Kenai
before fishing in the security zone. The Coast Guard will collect
information from them that is essential to keeping the pier secure from
sabotage or subversive activities.
Collection of Information
. It became effective on July 6, 2002, with the exception of one
paragraph, 33 CFR 165.1709(b)(1)(ii), which contains collection of
information requirements. This rule modified an existing collection of
information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3501-3520).
Because this section required the collection of information, it could
not become effective until it was reviewed and approved by the OMB. As
required by 44 U.S.C. 3507(d), we submitted a copy of this interim rule to
OMB for its review. On September 4, 2002, after reviewing the rule and the
overall collection of information burden under control no. 2115-0540, OMB
approved the collection of information required by this interim rule.
Federalism
A rule has implications for federalism under Executive Order 13132,
Federalism, if it has a substantial direct effect on State or local
governments and would either preempt State law or impose a substantial
direct cost of compliance on them. We have analyzed this rule under that
Order and have determined that it does not have implications for
federalism.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires
Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory
actions. In particular, the Act addresses actions that may result in the
expenditure by a State, local, or tribal government, in the aggregate, or
by the private sector of $100,000,000 or more in any one year. Though this
rule will not result in such an expenditure, we do discuss the effects of
this rule elsewhere in this preamble.
Taking of Private Property
This rule will not effect a taking of private property or otherwise
have taking implications under Executive Order 12630, Governmental Actions
and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights.
Civil Justice Reform
This rule meets applicable standards in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of
Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform, to minimize litigation,
eliminate ambiguity, and reduce burden.
Protection of Children
We have analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13045, Protection of
Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks. This rule is
not an economically significant rule and does not create an environmental
risk to health or risk to safety that may disproportionately affect
children.
Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments
This rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order
13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,
because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian
tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian
tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the
Federal Government and Indian tribes.
Energy Effects
We have analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use. We have determined that it is not a "significant
energy action" under that order because it is not a "significant
regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866 and is not likely to have a
significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.
It has not been designated by the Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy action.
Therefore, it does not require a Statement of Energy Effects under
Executive Order 13211.
Environment
We considered the environmental impact of this rule and concluded that
under figure 2-1, paragraph 34(g), of Commandant Instruction M16475.1D,
this rule is categorically excluded from further environmental
documentation. This rule fits paragraph 34(g) as it establishes a security
zone. A "Categorical Exclusion Determination" is available in the docket
for inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES.
Subjects in 33 CFR Part 165 Harbors, Marine safety, Navigation
(water), Reporting and Record keeping requirements, Security measures,
Waterways.
PART 165--REGULATED NAVIGATION AREAS AND LIMITED ACCESS AREAS
Accordingly, the interim rule amending 33 CFR part 165 that was
published at 67 FR 44059 on July 1, 2002, is adopted as a final rule
without change.
Dated: February 2626, 2003 .
H. Mark Hamilton
Commander, U. S. Coast Guard
Alternate Acting Captain of the Port, Western Alaska